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On Clausewitz

Reclaiming Clausewitz’s Theory of Victory
Richard M. Milburn

ABSTRACT: This article challenges a recent interpretation of
Carl von Clausewitz’s work On War that includes concepts such as
Natur, the trinity, and the primary elements of war. After discussing
the approaches of universalists and new wars scholars, the article
considers trinitarian relationships in the context of modern conflict.

I

n a recent article for Parameters, Emile Simpson challenged
conventional interpretations of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. In
particular, Simpson called into question the universal applicability
of Clausewitz’s theory of war and his theory of victory. Simpson also
challenged traditional views of the differences between the nature and the
character of war. The former is normally associated with the permanent
aspects of war, the latter its impermanent features. In his seminal work,
Clausewitz described what is generally considered to be the nature of
war: “A paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred,
and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play
of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam;
and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which
makes it subject to reason alone.” 1
The trinity has been a topic of debate for two broad schools of
thought: the universalists (or traditionalists) and the new wars scholars.
For the universalists, Clausewitz’s theory of war is timeless and
comprehensive: the Clausewitzian trinity and the nature of war are
synonymous.2 In contrast, the new wars scholars purport Clausewitz’s
theory of war is either temporal, situational, or both.3
Simpson provides the latest challenge to the universalists’ view. His
method of critique removes the trinity from the core of Clausewitz’s
theory of war and replaces it with the concept of the “duel.” In doing
so, Simpson relegates the most strategic Clausewitzian concept to minor
I am extremely grateful for the thoughtful comments and suggestions of Kevin C. Holzimmer,
Kelly A. Grieco, J. Wesley Hutto, and Ann M. Mezzell of the US Air Command and Staff College
as well as David C. Benson and James Kiras of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.
1      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
2      Colin S. Gray, “How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War,” Parameters 35, no.
1 (Spring 2005): 14–26; Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. Clausewitz in the TwentyFirst Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and
Contemporary War (New York: Oxford University Press), 2007.
3      Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991); Mary Kaldor, New
and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); and John Keegan, A
History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
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importance and promotes a narrow interpretation of the more tactical
duel in its place. This conceptualization presents a straw-man theory of
victory. This article uses the trinity to construct a more complete, and
fundamentally Clausewitzian, theory of victory.

Simpson’s Argument

Simpson’s major point, in keeping with the new wars scholars, is
that Clausewitz’s theory of war is not universal:
To understand what Clausewitz means by the nature of war, it is necessary
to recognize that there are two ideas of war at play in On War. One is the
abstract version found in the realm of logic, which Clausewitz identifies
as the nature of war. As Clausewitz stresses, “it must be observed that the
phrase the natural tendency of war, is used in its philosophical, strictly logical
sense alone and does not refer to the tendencies of the forces that are
actually engaged in the fighting—including—for instance, the morale and
emotions of the combatants.” 4

This is an admittedly troubling passage for universalists who
conflate the nature of war with the Clausewitzian trinity. If the natural
tendency of war does not include the emotions of the combatants, then
the nature of war, at least in the abstract form, does not contain one of
the elements of the trinity.
Simpson continues:
The other idea of war is the phenomenon produced when the abstract
concept of war is modified by reality, to give us real war. This is the idea
of war that we reach at the end of book 1, chapter 1, in which Clausewitz
presents his well-known image of the “total phenomenon” of war as it
appears in reality as a “trinity” comprised of three “dominant tendencies.”
These three tendencies effectively provide categorical buckets within which
to place the various reasons listed above for why war in reality moderates
the abstract concept.5

In this view, the trinity does not account for other causes of war,
such as religion or ideology. Moreover, Clausewitz’s theory cannot
be universal because it reflects a hierarchical relationship that is not
universal according to Simpson:
A hierarchical enemy is presupposed in any strategic theory based on
Clausewitz, given how he assumed the enemy to be a unified enemy. This
assumption provided the basis for his most important strategic concept, the
center of gravity, which necessarily presupposed the enemy had a “will,”
in the sense that it was a unified enemy. Thus, Clausewitz envisaged the
military strategist striking at the enemy’s center of gravity to translate a
military result into a political result because it was a physical representation
of the enemy’s will.6

Simpson considers such a theory of victory has little utility against
networked enemies, who have no fielded forces, nor a capital city, nor
4    Emile Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict,”
Parameters 47, no. 4 (Winter 2017–18): 9.
5      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 9.
6      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 16.
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necessarily alliances to attack. Since there would be no Clausewitzian
center of gravity to attack against a networked enemy, the theory of
victory must be limited, as would the theory of war.
At first glance, this argument makes sense. But when we consider
Clausewitz’s discussion of wars for limited aims, it does not. There are
wars where striking the enemy’s center of gravity would be unnecessary
to achieve the political aims of the war, which must guide the scale of
military effort to be made.7 In fact, decisively attacking centers of gravity
is not, and cannot be, Clausewitz’s theory of victory because it would
ignore great swathes of military history. While Simpson’s complex
explanation of On War is stimulating, such complexity is a blessing and
a curse.

Interpretation and Translation

The primary problems with Simpson’s article rest with his
discussion of the German word Natur and his interpretation of the duel.
His reasoning is based largely upon the English translation of the word
Natur, which has caused understandable confusion for Clausewitzian
scholars. Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s translation of On War, for
example, states, “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts
its characteristics to the given case.” 8 In contrast, Christopher Bassford’s
translation (which Simpson follows) asserts, “War is thus more than a
mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each
concrete case.” 9
In Simpson’s view, the later translation alters the distinction between
the nature and the character of war. There are two principal problems
with this belief. First, Natur can mean either nature or character, and
we have a difficult time separating these concepts philosophically.
Second, Bassford does not use “nature” in the same way as Simpson.
Bassford declares, “We should accept it as standing here for something
intermediate—much more consequential than the chameleon’s
superficial color, but less than truly fundamental or definitive.” 10 With
this intermediate understanding of Clausewitz’s intent, Natur could
mean, the magnitude of each element of the nature of war and the relationships between
the elements. Clausewitz is still referring exclusively to the elements of his
trinity and describing their variances and fluid interactions not only in
different wars but even in different theaters during the same war.11 This
interpretation is consistent with Clausewitz’s further discussion about
never fixing an arbitrary relationship between the elements of the trinity.
Simpson accepts an open-ended range of the types of war. But he
is mistaken to think the trinity does not account for them. A traditional
7     Clausewitz, On War, 585–94.
8     Clausewitz, On War, 89.
9    Christopher Bassford, “The Primacy of Policy and the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s Mature
Thought,” in Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz, 77.
10     Bassford, “Primacy of Policy,” 78.
11     This idea links to later discussion of Clausewitz’s use of the chameleon as a metaphor for
war. Changeability is inherent in the nature of both.
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view of the nature of war allows relationships within the trinity to be
endlessly changeable, yet requires each be present to some degree. This
understanding accounts for guerilla warfare and low intensity conflict,
countering the new wars scholars’ claims that the Clausewitzian trinity
is irrelevant in the modern age. War’s permanent elements cannot and
do not change. As M. L. R. Smith points out, “in the end, there is really
only one meaningful category of war, and that is war itself.” 12
Simpson goes on to suggest Clausewitz defined war as “nothing but
a duel on a larger scale.” 13 He claims Clausewitz’s use of the duel is insufficient as an abstract, comprehensive definition because it implies war
is a two-way, combat-centric struggle against a unitary enemy. Simpson
interprets the duel so narrowly as to remove any possible connection
to strategy.14
Clausewitz, however, was an avid student of history, cognizant
of the multifaceted character of war in the history of Europe, which
abounded with complex and changing alliances. Having fought for both
the Prussian and Russian armies in the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz was
fully aware of opposing national interests, shifting alliances, and the
absence of a simple two-way struggle. Furthermore, in the Clausewitzian
construction of war as simply the continuation of politics by other
means, the multifaceted character of politics must be common to both
politics and war.
Simpson further argues the duel metaphor implies war is combatcentric. While there must be an element of combat to meet a Clausewitzian
definition of war, war need not be combat-centric. All wars, including
the Napoleonic Wars, have extended periods of inactivity. Moreover,
the character of some wars is simply not combat-centric. Clausewitz
describes the fighting value of condottiere wars as negligible: “Extremes
of energy or exertion were conspicuous by their absence and fighting
was generally a sham.” 15 The notion is further supported through
Clausewitz’s treatment of limited wars for limited aims that he uses as
one mechanism to modify his simple definition of war as a duel: “The
political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine
both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it
requires.” 16 Sometimes, even the threat of force could be enough to
achieve the desired political objectives.
Viewing the enemy as a unitary actor is a common mistake.17 To
suggest Clausewitz conceptualized war as a contest between unitary
actors, however, dismisses his experience. In 1806, for example,
12     M. L. R. Smith, “Guerillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare,”
Review of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 34; and Colin M. Fleming, Clausewitz’s Timeless Trinity: A
Framework for Modern War (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 171.
13      Clausewitz, On War, 75.
14      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 10–11.
15      Clausewitz, On War, 587.
16      Clausewitz, On War, 81.
17    Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2017), 327.
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Clausewitz expressed his frustrations with the political wrangling in the
military by writing the Prussian army had “three commanders-in-chief
and two chiefs of staff.” 18 He was well acquainted with self-interested
parties and organizations affecting policy and viewed neither the enemy
nor the Prussian state as a unitary actor. In fact, Clausewitz’s entire
discussion about war being only a continuation of politics suggests a
symbiotic relationship representing a theory of victory rather than an
unsatisfactory reality of actual war. During war in the real world,
we must allow for natural inertia, for all the friction of its parts, for all the
inconsistency, imprecision, and timidity of man; and finally we must face
the fact that war and its forms result from ideas, emotions, and conditions
prevailing at the time—and to be quite honest we must admit that this was
the case even when war assumed its absolute state under Bonaparte.19

The friction of the political-military nexus is part of modern
warfare. The military commander may have to deal with the timidity of
political leadership, something Napoleon was spared. This was perhaps
a contributing factor in his spectacular run of victories.
Simpson’s view of Clausewitzian victory is that it is achieved by
locating and destroying the enemy’s center of gravity, which is where the
enemy’s will can be defeated.20 This perception implies the normal center
of gravity is the enemy army, though the capital city or key alliances
are other possibilities. Simpson’s claim that this theory of victory is
incomplete, as networked enemies lack such centers, is correct.
Nevertheless, he is incorrect in thinking this was Clausewitz’s
theory of victory. This concept represents a way to achieve victory only
in wars tending toward the absolute. Clausewitz’s broader theory of
victory centered on matching political ends with military means. In this
sense, war’s subordination to politics and to policy could be regarded as
an ideal state rather than a fact.
There is no universal theory of victory in On War. Starting with the
Clausewitzian trinity, however, a more complete conceptualization of
Clausewitz’s theory of victory is possible.

Strategic Interaction

Holistic consideration of the trinity is a fundamentally strategic
enterprise. War is a competition that can be characterized as the
protection of the friendly trinity while simultaneously attacking the
enemy’s trinity—a clash of trinities. During war, the magnitude of each of
the elements—passion, reason, and chance—is fluid and changes rapidly
due to precipitating events. “Our task,” said Clausewitz, “is to develop
a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies.” 21 At
18                 Carl von Clausewitz to Marie von Brühl, September 29, 1806, quoted in Peter Paret,
Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2007), 124.
19      Clausewitz, On War, 580.
20      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 16.
21      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
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the center of this balance is the state (or community) itself, composed
of the government, the people, and the military or its analogues.22
The relationships between these elements of the Clausewitzian social
trinity are constantly fluid and evolving, becoming stronger or weaker
depending on prevailing circumstances and as affected by myriad
factors including military action. The elements of the primary trinity,
the most powerful of which is passion, also influence relationships in
the social trinity.
Passion often acts as a binding force and may give the people
justification for war. Passion could be stoked by ideology, religion,
nationalism, injustice, racial hatred, or outrage to strengthen the resolve
to go to, or to stay at, war. In total war, passion can dominate rational
thought, which Captain Ramsey, Denzel Washington’s character in the
movie Crimson Tide, acknowledges, “The true nature of war is to serve
itself.” 23 As wars tend toward totality, passion takes on a logic of its own,
and increasingly, the military decision becomes the political end state.
Passion and reason may complement one another in wars of
necessity, but reason may equally counter passion. In limited wars,
directly linking political goals to the use of military force may be
difficult. This void is sometimes called the Clausewitzian gap.24 As
wars become more limited, and the justification of primordial violence
becomes more difficult, reason often comes to the fore, especially in
the information age where the horrors of war are continually dissected.
Constant network news coverage can alter public perception, especially
if friendly interests are unclear. In democracies where open debate is
encouraged, it can be especially hard to present a united political front,
which might be required to maintain public support for military action
and to protect one’s own trinity. This effort might call into question the
value of the military instrument of power in matters of limited national
interest. David Betz, among others, considers the diminishing utility of
war as a tool of policy.25
Chance is the embodiment of war’s uncertainty. At the extreme end,
the king of Persia lost an entire army to a sandstorm, and the Spanish
Armada was devastated by storms. Likewise, the death of Gustavus
Adolphus in 1632 during the Battle of Lützen quickly precipitated the
end of Sweden’s time as a great power. In the modern world of precision
weapons, luck is a more dangerous force precisely because the public
may be led to believe that accidents such as the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in 1999 are deliberate acts. Chance is ever-present
on the battlefield, and though it can be reduced, there may be, as General
22      This has been another bone of contention for the new wars scholars, but Bassford, Jan
Willem Honig, and James Gow have all constructed more flexible analogues for these actors.
Thomas Waldman, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 169.
23      Captain Ramsey to Commander Hunter in Crimson Tide, directed by Tony Scott (Hollywood
Pictures, 1995).
24      Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, Jason J. Lepore, eds., Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring
Success and Failure (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 17–18.
25     Betz David, Carnage and Connectivity: Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional Military Power
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 4–5.
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Stanley McChrystal found, a corresponding reduction in military
effectiveness or an increased risk to friendly forces.26
Understanding both trinities requires understanding the kind of
war the enemy is embarking upon as well as your own. There is no
natural balance here: a limited war for one side is not necessarily so for
the other or indeed for coalition partners on either side. The disparities
in military capability between sides in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
were more than balanced by the other side’s abundant passion and will
to keep fighting.27 Considering war in this light naturally leads to grand
strategic considerations that drag military leaders out of their comfort
zones and into the policy arena, which is where the only meaningful
victories reside.

A Clausewitzian Theory of Victory

In the clash of trinities, there are two ways to win a war.28 The
enemy trinity must be destroyed by breaking either a relationship in, or
an element of, its trinity. Clausewitz said an enemy’s power of resistance
is comprised of the total means at his disposal and the strength of his
will.29 Most battle-centric strategies attack capability, primarily within
the enemy’s military, but others, including coercive strategies, attack the
will to fight through trinitarian relationships. There are many possible
strategies to win wars beyond what Clausewitz actually discussed in
On War that can also be discussed through this theoretical extension.
One such example is Robert Pape’s four types of strategic bombing:
punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial.30 The trinitarian model can
show where a particular strategy is supposed to affect the enemy trinity.
But it is still incumbent upon the strategist to assess the metrics of how
successful such a strategy is or even if there is a causal link between
the choice of strategy and the intended breakdown of the relationship
being attacked.
As Simpson noted in War from the Ground Up, there may be many strategic audiences to particular actions in war.31 Thus, our actions to
affect the enemy’s trinity also have secondary and tertiary effects on
relationships in our own trinity that must be considered during strategic
deliberations. Punishment of a civilian population provides an excellent
example. Even though the model identifies the target as the peopleto-government relationship, it cannot indicate a probability of success.
Such a strategy posited by Giulio Douhet was sporadically successful in

26      “Tactical Directive,” Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, July 6, 2009.
27      Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,”
World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200.
28      Waldman, War, 161.
29      Clausewitz, On War, 77.
30      Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996).
31      Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
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Rotterdam and Rome during World War II despite more public failures
during the Combined Bomber Offensive.32
The repeated defacement of the statue of Sir Arthur Travers
“Bomber” Harris, the man synonymous with this British use of
airpower, illustrates how strongly the public can react to military action.
Risk, posited as a weaker form of punishment and unlikely to work,
targets the same mechanism. Both decapitation and denial try to affect
the government-to-military relationship. Denial is the only one of the
four strategies that targets both capability and will and is unsurprisingly
the most historically successful.
Many strategies attack the relationship between the people and
the government such as terrorism, economic war, attrition, and simply
enduring until the enemy’s public support wanes.33 A trinitarian
approach to assessing war allows us to look at key vulnerabilities as well
as opportunities; we must have continuous assessment of both since the
trinities are constantly changing. Moreover, war considered in this way
is not just about military activity but also about diplomacy, economics,
and information. Only through using all of the instruments of power
can strategy be optimized to protect the friendly trinity and to exploit
perceived weaknesses in the enemy’s.
For democracies such as the United States and Britain, who fight
on distant shores with conventional superiority, this raises questions
about likely enemy strategies and the limitations of friendly plans.
Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak
presciently observed “enemies will attack us asymmetrically. They will
take us where we’re weak, and they will negate our strengths, which
is our technology, and so the best way to do that is to get you into close
terrain—towns, cities, urban slums, forests, jungles.” 34
These attacks often occur in the information domain, where the
West must learn to fight more effectively. That will require congruence
between political thought and military action. The information domain
can be particularly problematic for democracies where attitudes to war
are openly discussed in their respective parliaments, inviting dissention.
As R. D. Hooker Jr. contends, war is “a contest of wills played out
by thinking and adaptive opponents.” 35 It is easy to attack the will of
Western democracies in wars of limited national interest, and it would
be foolish for most nations to try to attack a US-led coalition head-on.
Indirect strategies, therefore, come to the fore: “Asymmetry is inherent
in the nature of war.” 36

32     Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (London: Faber and Faber, 1943).
33      Some of these strategies are discussed in R. D. Hooker Jr., “Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character
and Conduct of Modern War,” Parameters 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 15.
34   General Charles Krulak (commandant, US Marine Corps), interview with Jim Lehrer,
NewsHour, PBS, June 25, 1999).
35     Hooker, “Beyond Vom Kriege,” 12.
36     Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Rediscovering US Military Strategy: A Role for Doctrine,” Journal
of Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 (January 2016): 233.
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Although indirect strategies may not have been the focus of On War,
a brief study of the trinity shows that these ideas are easily extrapolated
from it, which allows us to discuss war and strategy more generally than
Clausewitz himself did, to find a road to victory. During war, victory
comes about through the knowledge and protection of one’s own trinity
and the simultaneous knowledge and destruction of the enemy trinity.
This trinitarian strategic analysis mirrors Sun Tzu’s maxim: “Know
the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be
in peril.” 37 In this manner, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are perfectly aligned
regarding both the nature of war and the path to victory.

Conclusion

Simpson’s interpretation of Clausewitz removes much of the
explanatory power that the trinity possesses. His complex reading does
not enable predictive strategic consideration because it lacks clarity and
relegates discussion of On War to the tactical arena. While Simpson’s
argument is intellectually thought-provoking, its practical utility for
military and political professionals is questionable. Furthermore, this
interpretation unwisely clouds basic understandings of what war is. As
Antulio J. Echevarria II states, “Understanding the nature of war is
important for more than academic reasons; the nature of a thing tends
to define how it can and cannot be used, which, in the case of war, makes
it extremely important to both political and military leaders.” 38
By restoring Clausewitz’s trinity to its proper place we can advance a
more comprehensive theory of victory than even Clausewitz himself. The
link between military means and political ends forms a fundamental, but
insufficient, element of this theory because the singular dimension does
not account for the economic and informational instruments of power.
The expanded Clausewitzian theory of victory embraces the competitive
nature of war, showing the flexibility and utility of the Clausewitzian
trinity at the grand and military strategic levels of war. This simple
model can help military and political professionals bridge their different
conceptual approaches to strategy, leading to better considerations
of second- and third-order effects. This deeper understanding and
consideration of the inadvertent and adverse consequences of military
action is essential to the pursuit of successful grand strategy.

37      Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1971), 84.
38      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Nature of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2003), v.

